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Introduction 
The papers prepared for this Colloquium on “Emerging 
Ecological Policy: Winners and Losers” devote strikingly little 
discussion to who actually wins or loses as a result of new poli- 
cies. While this may he good, it bean some critical reflection, 
especially since environmental policy has more than once been 
caught up short on the problem of distributive justicc (c.g., 
Schnaiherg, et al. 1986; Bullard 1990). No doubt part of the 
explanation is the sheer difficulty of accurately measuring 
costs and benefits and connecting them to specific individuals 
and groups. However, the larger reason may be that ecological 
policy has moved from being marginalized as either an eco- 
nomic or an aesthetic issue, to being a central arena for the 
ongoing construction of governance institutions. Thus, the 
Colloquium papers do attend to winners and losers, but largely 
in terms of their institutionalized ability to shape environmen- 
tal decisions, rather than the direct benefits or losses they may 
experience. 
This comment focuses on key points ahout the distribution 
of authority in ecological policy. First, the existing distribution 
is considerably more dispersed than most of the Colloquium 
authors tend to assume. Second, current natural resource poli- 
cy scholarship suffers from two key shortcomings: an inahili- 
ty to analyze the cumulative effects of systems of rules and a 
serious lack of attention to the policy roles of non-governmen- 
tal, nonmarket international organizations. 
Ecological Authority 
Although it is common and intellectually convenient to 
conceptualize authority over any given action as held hy an 
individual actor, law and other social control mechanisms typ- 
ically share authority out among plural agents (Walker 1995; 
Meidinger 1996). Thus, both public and private landowners 
may have formal authority to decide how many animals to 
graze on their land, or how many trees to harvest-but they 
must also take due account of effects on neighbors, mineral 
owners, future owners, water quality, taxes, endangered 
species, creditors, shareholders, employees, customers, and a 
host of other interests. Traditionally, law has been used to 
institutionalize those interests in the form of rules and proce- 
dures. The best justification for using law in this way is that it 
can protect the interests of many actors while eliminating the 
need to negotiate with them over every individual decision. 
Rules have a way of accumulating over time, however, and 
recent years have seen growing complaints that their combined 
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effect is to overburden action, stifle creativity, foster ineffi- 
ciency, etc. While these complaints have a cyclical history, and 
hark hack to a mythic Anglo-Saxon freedom that probably 
never existed (e.g., Meidinger 1993), they may also indicate 
that we have crossed a threshold of legal complexity and need 
to develop less complex and burdensome institutional guidance 
systems. 
Institutional Change 
Although the judicial retrenchment documented hy Keiter 
(1996) promises to be an important institutional adjustment, 
the Colloquium papers advocate several others. One of the 
most common, discussed by Hess (1996) and Randall (1996), 
is simply to lop off certain rule-defined claims and convert the 
remaining ones into marketable property rights held by partic- 
ular actors. This approach limits deposed claimants to biddmg 
for resources in the market, and is thus critically dependent on 
defming property rights that adequately protect essential social 
values for which there will he no bidders. 
A second approach, advocated hy all the Colloquium 
papers, is to hold a new round of negotiations among relevant 
interests in hopes of working out a new set of policy parame- 
ters. As in the property rights strategy, important substantive 
policy decisions are often made in deciding which interests to 
include in the negotiations. Lee (1996), for example, advo- 
cates the superiority of local or “community” organizations for 
ecological management, whereas Merchant (1996) advocates 
inclusion of a more expansive, open-ended set of interests. 
Although negotiating groups can he convened by either private 
or governmental actors, governments are often important in 
ratifying and enforcing outcomes. Governments increasingly 
institute negotiation processes when problems are especially 
complex or their capacity to handle them is uncertain (e.g., 
Perritt 1986). 
A thiid approach is simply to develop new rules (such as 
the “outcome-based” form advocated by Hess 1996) to adjust 
or displace old ones. In principle, this could be pursued at any 
or all of three levels: local, national, and international. In prac- 
tice, the local watershed management efforts discussed in the 
other Colloquium papers have led to some changes in rules and 
are likely to lead to more. They are inevitably constrained, 
however, hy the fact that many of the key U.S. rules were made 
hy the national government, and are difficult to affect from the 
local level. 
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At the national level, there has been relatively little effort 
to achieve comprehensive revisions in rules. Private organiza- 
tions have occasionally suggested the general outlines of gen- 
eral statutory revisions, but have not put significant resources 
into producing comprehensive new rule systems. The federal 
government recently concluded a comprehensive review of 
existing laws, but, for reasons discussed below, did not propose 
any comprehensive legal change (Interagency Ecosystem 
Management Task Force 1995). 
Some of the most sweeping efforts to create new rules and 
institutions for natural resources are occurring not only at the 
international level, but in the private and quasi-private sphere. 
The most prominent, the Forest Stewardship Council and the 
International Standards Organization are described in a sepa- 
rate article (Meidmger 1997). The remainder of the present 
paper addresses the current research gaps in the areas of the 
cumulative effects of rule systems and of private international 
natural resource policy making institutions. 
Research Needs 
Comprehensive Federal Environmental Law Reform. 
Despite countless calls for integrating, streamlining, or harmo- 
nizing federal environmental laws (e.g., Guruswamy 1992), 
there have been strikingly few efforts to actually do so. The 
recent report by the Interagency Task Force on Ecosystem 
Management (1995) concluded that existing federal laws do 
not seriously inhibit the development of cross-jurisdictional, 
coordinated ecosystem management and that no significant 
legal reform is called for. While this report was prepared 
entirely by federal officials and could be seen as reflecting a 
fear of undermining core structures of government, it more 
likely reflects the enormous intellectual difficulty of dealing 
with cumulative effects of rules. Considered individually, as is 
the custom in legal scholarship, most existing rules make sense 
and can be dealt with. Because legal scholars have not devel- 
oped widely accepted methods for analyzing whole systems of 
rules, however, we and our students find it difficult to develop 
shared diagnoses of systems. A key need in future scholarship, 
therefore, is to develop a stronger capacity to analyze the 
cumulative effects of rules. 
Scholarly Inattention to Private International Policy-mak- 
ing. A more puzzling shortcoming, given this decade’s focus 
on domestic private policy-makiing systems such as marketable 
property rights and alternative dispute resolution processes, 
has been the striking inattention to non-governmental policy- 
making processes at the international level. This research 
deficit is likely to reduce both the contributions scholars can 
make to those processes and our ability to analyze them criti- 
cally. Although there are probably many reasons for this 
neglect, several can be noted here. First, private international 
natural resource organizations rarely hire policy scholars, and 
when they do, it is generally to address a fairly narrow ques- 
tion rather than to perform comprehensive reflective work. 
Conversely, those organizations generally have sufficient 
resources not to depend on scholars for the kind of gratis work 
that often leads to on-the-side policy research in local domains. 
Second, the conventional assumption of the policy disciplines 
that governments make policy and markets do not continues to 
hold broad sway in the natural resources field. The policy-mak- 
ing roles of business f m s  and associations come into cog- 
nizance primarily in their efforts to influence governments, and 
those of a third category of non-governmentalhonmarket insti- 
tutions have hardly been noticed. Like our failure to study the 
cumulative effects of legal rules, this is a critical shortcoming. 
The role of these “third stream” institutions is an area in urgent 
need of research. 
Endnote 
I .  Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Sociology, 
State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 
(eemeid@acsu.buffalo.edu). 
References 
Bullard, R. 1990. Dumping in Dirie: Race, Class and 
Environmental QualiQ. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
GUNSW~IIIY, L. 1992. Integrated pollution control: the 
expanding matrix. Environmental Law. 77: 118-152. 
Hess, K. 1996. Political rights and policy wrongs: The ecol- 
ogy of conflict on America’s Western public lands. Paper 
prepared for the Colloquium on Emerging Ecological 
Policy: Winners and Losers, Corvallis, OR, September 
23. 
Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force. 1995. The 
Ecosystem Approach: Healthy Ecosystems and 
Sustainable Economies. Washington, DC: U S .  
Government. 
Keiter, R.B. 1996. Ecological policy and the courts: Of rights, 
processes, and the judicial role. Paper prepared for the 
Colloquium on Emerging Ecological Policy: Winners and 
Losers, Corvallis, OR, September 23. 
Knight, P. 1996. Forests for life. Ecolabel: The mark of good 
management. The Observer (September): 16. 
Lee, R.G. 1996. Are our tenure and resource management 
institutions ecologically rational? Paper prepared for the 
Colloquium on Emerging Ecological Policy: Winners and 
Losers, Corvallis, OR, September 23. 
Merchant, C. 1996. Fish first! The changing ethics of ecosys- 
tem management. Paper prepared for the Colloquium on 
Emerging Ecological Policy: Winners and Losers, 
Corvallis, OR, September 23. 
Meidinger, E.E. 1993. The Changing Legal Environment of 
Northern Forest Policy Making. In Sustaining Ecosystems, 
Economies, and a Way of Life in the Northern Forests. 
Washington, DC: The Wilderness Society. 
50 Human Ecology Review. Val. 4, No. I 
~. 1996. Organizational and Legal Challenges for 
Ecosystem Management. In Kathryn A. Kohm and Jerry F. 
Franklin, Creating a Foreshy for the 21st Centwy: The 
Science of Ecosystem Management. Covallo, CA and 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
. 1997. Look who’s making the rules. Paper prepared 
for the Colloquium on Emerging Ecological Policy: 
Winners and Losers, Corvallis, OR, September 23, 1996. 
Perritt, H.H., Jr. 1986. Negotiated rulemakmg before federal 
agencies: Evaluation of recommendations by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States. 
Georgetown Law Journal 1625-1735. 
Randall, A. 1996. Ecological policies for an age of political 
and social fragmentation. Paper prepared for the 
Colloquium on Emerging Ecological Policy: Winners and 
Losers, Corvallis, OR, September 23. 
Schnaiherg, A,, N. Watts and K. Zimmerman, eds. 1986. 
Distributional Conflicts in Environmental-Resource 
Policy Aldershot, Great Britain: Gower. 
Walker, V.R. 1995. Shared management of reasonable risk: 
Implications for environmental assessment and monitor- 
ing. Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Law 11:l-37. 
Human Ecology Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 51 
